18.09.2008 Russia, St. Petersburg. Activists of the Russian Imperial Movement held a rally in Central St. Petersburg aimed against "NATO's expansion in the Crimea and former Soviet republics."
Photo: Mikhail Razuvaev
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NATO's Major Dilemma
The meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, which has caused so much speculation in the past half a year, is going to be a routine one. Even Washington no longer insists on giving Ukraine and Georgia the membership action plan (MAP).
Kiev and Tbilisi will be offered to step up efforts aimed at inner transformation to reach the required standards as soon as possible. Debates will continue at the NATO summit in April, although the situation is unlikely to have changed significantly by that time.
Ukraine and Georgia’s Governments should mainly blame themselves. They made all possible steps to give formal grounds for their application to be turned down.
For example Ukraine missed the chance of a breakthrough at the alliance’s summit in Bucharest, and in Riga a year and a half before. At that time Moscow did not show such determination to oppose the Ukrainian Government’s NATO ambitions as in 2008. But Victor Yushchenko was engaged in another confrontation with the majority of his own elite, including his westernized adherents, and Euro-Atlantic powers were unable to do anything about the political masquerade in Kiev.
Georgia staked on the Russian threat, rather than internal changes. But the plan boomeranged on Tbilisi: NATO so much believed in the threat that decided not to get involved in it all. And since the Georgian democracy’s image was damaged, it was easy to find a pretext.
Does it mean that NATO expansion has been removed from the agenda? No, it doesn’t. The new U.S. administration will be committed to this idea as the outgoing one. Especially if foreign policy is outlined by the Clinton clan. The assumption that further expansion of Atlantic institutes serves the purpose of peace and stability is one of the intrinsic ideas of the U.S. political establishment.
The Old World is much more cautious, but the problem is it lacks a common position; moreover, this matter is going to become a part of a wider inner intrigue. France solidifies its leadership in Europe, pursuing a tricky policy regarding the terms of its returning into the military organization of NATO; therefore bargains are not ruled out, with Paris’ stance possibly changing. However, NATO expansion weakens Old Europe’s positions — it is clear that former Soviet republics will side with the U.S. mostly.
The North Atlantic alliance’s major dilemma has little to do with Eastern Europe. The question of NATO’s mission under the new circumstances hasn’t been resolved yet. Barack Obama will try to inspire allies to make new achievements outside the traditional responsibility zone, but Europe’s readiness to bear a military burden in the East is too low. Afghanistan is obviously turning into the main military conflict; and most experts confess that it is practically impossible to win the war there. The escalation of tensions in Hindustan after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai will affect the local state of affairs — Pakistan is the crossroads of many problems. NATO’s future depends on its ability to become an effective tool in that region, rather than its speed of penetrating the post-Soviet space.
Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine
All the Article in Russian as of Dec. 02, 2008
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